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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby1 creates a 
framework in which state prisoners who are denied federal habeas re-
lief may invoke Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
seek review of the decision without impermissibly circumventing 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s restrictions on second or successive habeas peti-
tions (“SSHPs”).  Gonzalez creates a more concrete analysis based on 
the nature of the relief sought by the petitioner, while also addressing 
some of the concerns of equity raised by an overly broad interpreta-
tion of the restrictions that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pe-
nalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) places on successive petitions for federal 
habeas relief. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court wrote that “[c]onventional notions of 
finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and 
infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.”2  The notion now 
seems almost quaint.  On April 24, 1996, a year after the April 19th 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
President Clinton signed AEDPA into law.3  As an attempt by Con-
gress to address the dual threats of foreign and domestic terrorism, 
the bill was widely recognized as a failure:  before approving the 
measure by a narrow majority, the House of Representatives stripped 
the bill of several counterterrorism provisions, particularly those that 
sought to expand the authority of the Federal Government to use 
 
 * Thank you to Professor Catherine T. Struve for her help in selecting this topic.  Thank 
you to Professor Struve and Rachel Flipse, J.D ‘10, for their help in preparing this article 
for publication. 
 1 545 U.S. 524 (2005). 
 2 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). 
 3 See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on Terrorism and Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 1996, at A18; see also David Johnston, Clues Are Lacking:  U.S. Officials Scurry for An-
swers—Reno to Ask Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1 (describing the initial in-
vestigation into the Oklahoma City bombing). 
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wiretaps.4  At the same time, the families of crime victims (particularly 
the families of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing) celebrated 
the bill’s passage.  Believing that AEDPA would ensure swift justice 
for the accused bombers and other prisoners convicted of capital 
crimes, these families had pressured Congress over the course of the 
bill’s development.5 
AEDPA greatly restricts the ability of state prisoners to proceed 
with a successive habeas petition, even if the successive petition raises 
a new claim or introduces evidence not presented in an initial peti-
tion for habeas relief.6  State prisoners who wish to submit an SSHP 
must first seek the permission of the court of appeals, and the appel-
late court may grant permission only under certain narrowly defined 
conditions.7  Some state prisoners have attempted to circumvent 
these restrictions by relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 
which allows parties to seek relief from a final judgment on grounds 
such as clerical error, fraud or misrepresentation by government 
agents, or the discovery of new evidence not previously discoverable 
with “reasonable diligence.”8  While the plain language of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 bars the use of SSHP under most circumstances, the applica-
bility of Rule 60(b) to habeas proceedings has not received quite as 
much focus. 
This Comment addresses the question in three parts.  The first 
section briefly reviews the statutory framework surrounding the use of 
Rule 60(b) in habeas proceedings.  The second section looks at cases 
through which the federal courts had tried to develop a workable 
standard for applying Rule 60(b) to the habeas process:  while some 
 
 4 Stephen Labaton, House Passes Narrow Counterterrorism Bill Unlike Senate’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 1996, at A18; see also 142 CONG. REC. 7554 (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden) (arguing 
that AEDPA’s restrictions on habeas corpus were less likely to deter potential terrorists 
than the expanded investigative powers that the House had stripped from the bill); id. at 
7558 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (commiserating with Sen. Biden’s frustration regarding 
the absence of certain provisions while advocating for the bill’s passage). 
 5 See, e.g., Julie DelCour, Victims’ Survivors Speak out to Urge Curbs on Appeals, TULSA WORLD 
(Okla.), Feb. 1, 1996, at A1 (discussing victims’ relatives mission to “stop lengthy inmate 
death-row appeals”).  The rapidly approaching anniversary of the attack was very much 
on the minds of the Senators as they gathered to discuss the conference report.  Compare 
142 CONG. REC. 7548 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that Senate consideration 
of the conference report on AEDPA coincided with the one-year anniversary of the Okla-
homa City bombing), with id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (observing that Congress 
had not felt any urgency to address these questions in the months prior to the pending 
anniversary). 
 6 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) § 106(b), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2) (2006). 
 7 Id. 
 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
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circuits concluded that the rule had no place in the habeas process, 
and treated a motion under the rule as an attempt by state prisoners 
to circumvent the provisions of AEDPA, others believed that a peti-
tioner filing a Rule 60(b) motion sought a form of relief entirely dif-
ferent from a petitioner who filed an SSHP.  These courts held a 
much broader view of the rule’s use in the context of habeas pro-
ceedings. 
Ultimately, a synthesis doctrine emerged out of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit that reconciled these conflicting policies.  First articulated by 
Judge Gerald Tjoflat in a dissent to an Eleventh Circuit opinion, this 
doctrine distinguishes between Rule 60(b) motions that seek to ad-
vance a claim which are barred as successive attempts by State prison-
ers to attack their trial court convictions, and true Rule 60(b) mo-
tions which seek review of the habeas process itself.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed this doctrine in Gonzalez, and the Court’s decision 
provides a basis for courts to examine a Rule 60(b) motion seeking 
review of a decision to deny habeas relief. 
The final section of this comment discusses the impact of Gonzalez, 
relying on a 2009 decision in the Ninth Circuit to demonstrate how 
the application of Rule 60(b) to the habeas process addresses fears 
that an overly broad reading of AEDPA may restrict the ability of state 
prisoners to raise legitimate issues regarding the process by which a 
district court denied their original applications for habeas relief. 
II.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A. The Availability of Habeas Relief to State Prisoners 
Habeas corpus is one of the fundamental privileges outlined in 
the Constitution.9  In its original incarnation, however, federal habeas 
relief was contemplated only for prisoners who were “in custody, un-
der or by colour of the authority of the United States, or . . . [who 
were] committed for trial before some court of the same.”10  In 1867, 
 
 9 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in Cas-
es of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
There was little debate over whether a guarantee of habeas corpus should be included in 
the Constitution; most discussion focused on how broadly the guarantee should be 
granted.  Compare 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 438 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911) (debating whether the suspension of habeas corpus should only be per-
mitted “on the most urgent occasions,” or whether the right of habeas corpus should be 
held “inviolable”) with id. at 345–50 (deliberating over the nature, scope and wording of 
the Constitution’s provisions addressing treason). 
 10 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996) (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 
Stat. 82 (establishing the United States judicial courts)). 
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Congress expanded the doctrine of habeas corpus to include “all cas-
es where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in viola-
tion of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the United 
States,” thereby providing State prisoners an opportunity to seek re-
lief at the federal level.11 
B. Federal Habeas Relief for State Prisoners (28 U.S.C. § 2254) 
The statutory procedures by which a state prisoner may seek ha-
beas relief in the federal courts are described in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.12  A 
prisoner convicted in the state courts must exhaust all potential re-
medies at the state level before a federal district court may entertain a 
petition for habeas relief.13  There is a presumption at the federal lev-
el that a state court decision is correct, and the burden rests on the 
petitioner to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evi-
dence.14  A § 2254 petitioner may not appeal a final order in a habeas 
proceeding unless “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-
pealability,” finding that the applicant “has made a substantial show-
ing of the denial of a constitutional right.”15  The Supreme Court lat-
er clarified that a § 2254 petitioner may seek an appeal of a final 
judgment in a habeas proceeding by showing “at least, that jurists of 
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid 
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason 
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 
procedural ruling.”16  In clarifying this burden, the Supreme Court 
referenced both a claim relying on the denial of a “constitutional 
 
 11 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, quoted in Felker, 518 U.S. at 659.  But see Ex parte 
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (requiring that a petitioner seeking habeas relief in the 
federal courts exhaust state proceedings as a threshold matter).  Supreme Court affirma-
tion of the exhaustion requirement was later codified by statute in 1948.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (1952). 
 12 “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [for a prisoner held pursuant to a State 
court judgment] only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C.  § 2254(a). 
 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  Of course, if no corrective remedies are available at the 
state level, or if “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the 
rights of the applicant,” a federal district court may still entertain an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 
 14 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 
 15 Id. § 2253(c). 
 16 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).  “The writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role 
in protecting constitutional rights.  In setting forth the preconditions for issuance of 
a . . . [Certificate of Appealability] under § 2253(c), Congress expressed no intention to 
allow trial court procedural error to bar vindication of substantial constitutional rights on 
appeal.”  Id. at 483. 
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right,” and a challenge raised against the underlying integrity of the 
habeas process.  This distinction became important as courts began 
to consider the application of Rule 60(b) motions to habeas proceed-
ings. 
C. AEDPA’s Bar on Successive Habeas Petitions (28 U.S.C. § 2244) 
By enacting, and later amending, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Congress 
voiced its specific concerns about abuse of the writ of habeas corpus 
by state prisoners.17  Under this provision, habeas claims previously 
raised before the district court are, on their face, dismissed.18  If a 
claim was not raised previously, the petitioner must show that the 
claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable” to the district court.19  Alternatively, the petitioner must 
show that the underlying facts of the claim could not have been dis-
covered through due diligence, and that they show, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that “no reasonable factfinder” could have con-
victed the petitioner but for the asserted constitutional error.20  
Because § 2244(b)(2) explicitly contemplates the use of previously 
unavailable evidence by a petitioner submitting an SSHP, the absence 
of such a provision in § 2244(b)(1) suggests that the “mere” discovery 
of new evidence is insufficient to allow a federal court to review a pre-
viously presented habeas claim. 
Permission to present an SSHP must be granted by a court of ap-
peals.21  Even if a court of appeals grants authorization to a petitioner 
to submit his successive petition for habeas relief to the district court, 
the district court must dismiss the successive prayer “unless the appli-
cant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244].”22 
1. Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 
In 1948, citing the growing threat of “repetitious, meritless re-
quests for relief,” Congress drafted 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which stated 
 
 17 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (exempting federal prisoners who seek habeas relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 from the restrictions imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244). 
 18 Id. § 2244(b)(1). 
 19 Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). 
 20 Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 21 See id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).  The specific procedure for reviewing a request to submit an 
SSHP is also outlined within this provision.  See id. 
 22 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). 
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that a federal court was not “required to entertain an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus” from a state or federal prisoner if an SSHP 
restated claims that the court had resolved in the original petition.23  
An attached Reviser’s Note asserts “[t]his section makes no material 
change in existing practice. . . . [since] the courts have consistently 
refused to entertain successive ‘nuisance’ applications for habeas 
corpus.”24 
2. 1966 Amendments 
In 1966, the statute was amended with the introduction of 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b), which allowed the federal courts to make a deter-
mination of the petitioner’s good faith when deciding whether to en-
tertain an SSHP.25  If the court believed that a petitioner had delibe-
rately withheld an otherwise novel argument from the original habeas 
petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) gave the court the authority to dismiss 
the petition.26  The new amendments were designed to relieve the 
perceived burden on the federal courts caused by the state prisoners 
who “fil[e] applications either containing allegations identical to 
those asserted in a previous application that has been denied, or pre-
dicated upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed 
the preceding application.”27  Legislative history accompanying the 
1966 amendments still explicitly contemplated the good-faith discov-
ery of new evidence “relating to an alleged denial of a [f]ederal 
right,” and observed that, in such a case, “the court would be obliged 
to entertain the writ.”28 
 
 23 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 Revisor’s Note (1952) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 2244, 62 Stat. 869, 965).  The fact that Congress codified the state exhaustion re-
quirement at the same time as implementing the first restrictions on successive state peti-
tions for habeas relief suggests that the state process has always been a specific point of 
concern for the Legislature. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Habeas Corpus Act of 1966 § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970).  The 1966 amendments to 28 
U.S.C. § 2244 also introduced a provision which codified the district court’s deference to 
conclusions of fact or law reached by the Supreme Court during the petitioner’s initial 
round of appeals.  See id. § 2244(c). 
 26 Id. § 2244(b). 
 27 S. REP. NO. 89-1797, at 2 (1966); see also id. at 1 (“The number of applications by State 
prisoners for writs of habeas corpus has been steadily increasing [from 134 in 1941 to 
3,773 in the first 9 months of  fiscal year 1966]. . . . More than 95 percent of these appli-
cations were held to be without merit.”). 
 28 Id. at 2. 
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3. 1996 Amendments (AEDPA) 
During the 1996 Senate debates over AEDPA, the question of ha-
beas reform seemed to take priority over discussion regarding any of 
the provisions of the bill that were explicitly designed to prevent ter-
rorist attacks.  Earlier, the House of Representatives had removed a 
number of counterterrorism provisions from AEDPA, particularly 
those involving surveillance by intelligence agencies.29  In the absence 
of these provisions, both AEDPA’s supporters and detractors agreed 
that habeas reform was the primary purpose of the bill.30  AEDPA’s 
supporters traced narratives of murderers who had delayed their ex-
ecutions through repeated meritless petitions for habeas relief.31  The 
bill’s supporters also invoked the wishes of the families of the victims 
of the Oklahoma City bombing, who were vocal in their desire for the 
expedient execution of the accused bombers.32  Based on the legisla-
tive record accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there was a clear and tar-
geted intent by Congress to close off certain paths to state prisoners 
seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
D. Habeas Rule 11 
Habeas Rule 11 states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
may be used with respect to habeas proceedings “to the extent that 
 
 29 See Labaton, supra note 4 (discussing that the Senate has “historically resisted approving 
legislation that merely limited habeas corpus appeals by state and Federal inmates”).  
This modification was a source of consternation for the Senate.  See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 
7548–51 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (commiserating with Sen. Biden’s frustration 
regarding the state of the bill); see also id. at 7567 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“That is what 
this is about—35 folks in the House who do not like [a proposed wiretap provision].  
That is why we are going to vote against our interest probably in the next couple of 
hours.”). 
 30 Compare id. at 7550 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Most important, this conference bill con-
tains the habeas corpus reform proposal contained in the Senate terrorism bill.”) with id. 
at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“This is a great habeas corpus bill. . . . This is a habeas 
corpus bill with a little terrorism thrown in.”). 
 31 E.g., 142 CONG. REC. 7573–75 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (outlining a 12-year process 
from conviction to execution for an accused murderer, and entering into the Record a 
chronology of “57 separate actions” taken in the Federal courts with respect to that 
process).  But see id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (contending that the vast majority 
of delays occur in the state courts, beyond the reach of the proposed Federal statute). 
 32 See 142 CONG. REC. at 7564 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (“The No. 1 provision 
that . . . [the victims’ families] want in this bill is the so-called habeas corpus reform.  
They want an end to these endless appeals of people who have been convicted of atro-
cious crimes and murders.”).  But see id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that 
the trial of the Oklahoma City bombers was under way in federal court, and that the ap-
plication of these reforms to their case would require the district attorney to delay a fed-
eral conviction and execution to try the defendants again in a state court). 
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they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions.”33  Because of 
the limitations instituted by AEDPA, prisoners have invoked the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in an effort to preserve or expand their 
access to habeas corpus; in practice, however, courts have been cir-
cumspect in applying the Federal Rules to habeas proceedings in 
such a manner.34  This judicial restraint frustrates attempts to raise 
untimely claims for habeas relief, which seems consistent with Con-
gress’s intent in enacting AEDPA, and suggests that the courts should 
take a somewhat narrow approach when faced with similar attempts 
to apply the Federal Rules to habeas proceedings. 
III.  RULE 60(B) AS IT APPLIES TO HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 
A. Conflicting Doctrines Regarding the Use of Rule 60(b) Motions in Habeas 
Proceedings 
In the wake of AEDPA’s passage, conflicting doctrines arose re-
garding Rule 60(b) should apply to habeas proceedings.35  For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit found that, while a petition for habeas corpus 
is a request for the court to declare a conviction invalid on Constitu-
tional grounds, a Rule 60(b) motion “seeks only to vacate the federal 
court judgment dismissing the habeas petition,” and is “merely a step 
along the way” to habeas relief.36  Because the Second Circuit con-
cluded that a Rule 60(b) motion is distinguishable from an SSHP, the 
court recommended that petitioners be granted leave to file Rule 
60(b) motions.37  At the other extreme, several circuits resolved that a 
state prisoner could never invoke Rule 60(b) in response to a denied 
petition for habeas corpus because the ultimate goal of a Rule 60(b) 
motion is not a direct challenge to the habeas proceeding, but an in-
 
 33 See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Court, R. 11, 28 U.S.C. 
app. § 2254 (2006).  
 34 See, e.g., United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that liberal 
grants of “relation back” under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would 
undermine the intent of Congress in passing AEDPA); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 
644, 655 (2005) (holding that a trial may not serve as a common transaction for Rule 15 
relation back); Peterson v. Brennan, 196 F. App’x 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (refusing to 
treat a petitioner’s motion to supplement as an SSHP, but ultimately denying Rule 15 re-
lation back and dismissing supplementary claims as untimely). 
 35 See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 725–26 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit split 
on the issue). 
 36 See Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 37 This “always permitted” interpretation was not widely recognized, and was only advanced 
by the Second Circuit.  See Pridgen, 380 F.3d at 725 (discussing that the “Second Circuit 
alone” has taken such a position). 
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direct challenge to the underlying conviction.38  Because the motion 
seeks to overturn the conviction, circuits that universally denied Rule 
60(b) motions in response to denied petitions for habeas corpus saw 
the effort as an attempt to circumvent the restrictions established by 
AEDPA.39 
Most courts that flatly denied the use of Rule 60(b) in habeas pro-
ceedings relied on the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ele-
venth Circuit in Felker v. Turpin.40  Felker appeared before the Eleventh 
Circuit on remand from a Supreme Court case in which the Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of AEDPA’s restrictions on the writ of ha-
beas corpus.41  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that 
AEDPA’s restrictions on SSHP constitute a “modified res judicata 
rule” which restrain “abuse of the writ” but do not suspend habeas 
corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause.42  The Supreme Court 
also dismissed Felker’s petition for certiorari, holding that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 (b)(3) prevented the Court from reviewing a lower court’s de-
cision to deny a petitioner leave to file an SSHP.43 
Denied review by the Supreme Court, Felker filed two additional 
petitions for habeas relief—both of which were denied by the district 
court.44  After the district court denied his fourth application for ha-
beas relief, Felker filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court, in-
voking subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6).45  On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit panel held that “the established law of this cir-
cuit . . . forecloses . . . [petitioner’s] position that Rule 60(b) motions 
are not constrained by successive petition rules.”46  With the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Felker be-
came an important precedent in habeas jurisprudence.47 
 
 38 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin (Felker II), 101 F.3d 657, 661 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
(“Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent restraints on successive habeas petitions.”), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 989 (1996). 
 39 Cf. Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337 (affirming the denial of a prisoner’s untimely amendment to a 
habeas petition because granting leave to amend would frustrate the intent of AEDPA’s 
one-year statute of limitations). 
 40 Felker II, 101 F.3d at 658. 
 41 Felker v. Turpin (Felker I), 518 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1996). 
 42 Felker II, 518 U.S. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43 Id. at 658–59.  The Court also denied a direct prayer made to them for an original habeas 
petition.  Id. at 665. 
 44 Felker I, 101 F.3d at 659–60. 
 45 Id. at 660.  Respectively, subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) address claims of:  mistake; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud or misconduct by the opposing party; and “any other 
reason that justifies relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 46 Felker I, 101 F.3d at 661. 
 47 See, e.g., Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975–76 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing 
Felker I to deny Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion as an SSHP under AEDPA). 
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Between these two extremes a third plurality view has emerged.  
This plurality view distinguishes between “true” Rule 60(b) motions 
that are designed to address procedural issues within the habeas pro-
ceeding, and masked attempts to “collaterally attack” the underlying 
conviction through a Rule 60(b) motion.48  This interpretation 
represents a valid synthesis of the two extremes:  legitimate Rule 
60(b) motions do have an ultimate goal that is distinct from that of 
an initial or successive petition for habeas corpus, while attempts to 
disguise an SSHP as a Rule 60(b) motion serve only to frustrate the 
intent of Congress in enacting AEDPA.  Drawing a distinction be-
tween “legitimate” Rule 60(b) motions and masked successive habeas 
petitions allows for the broad use of the rule, while ensuring that it is 
only used for its legitimate intended purpose—to vacate the prior fi-
nal judgment from which the motion originates, and not to overturn 
an underlying criminal proceeding. 
B. Development of a Doctrine of Distinction 
In an early attempt to distinguish between legitimate Rule 60(b) 
motions and masked successive habeas petitions, the Ninth Circuit 
held in 1998 that a petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion was an SSHP but 
suggested that, under certain circumstances, a Rule 60(b) motion 
filed in response to a denied petition for habeas relief could evade 
the restrictions of AEDPA.49  For example, if state misconduct pre-
 
 48 See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming a lower court’s dis-
missal of portions of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion which directly attacked state convic-
tion); see also Banks v. United States, 167 F.3d 1082, 1084 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) 
(“Rule 60(b) is, however, an appropriate means to bring a claim that the conduct of 
counsel affected the integrity of the court’s habeas proceeding.”). 
 49 See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998), remanded from 523 U.S. 
538, 540 (1998).  But see id. at 927 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“I doubt there could be any  
form of papers seeking . . . federal relief from a state conviction and sentence, after fed-
eral relief had previously been denied, that would not fall within the statutory provisions 
governing second or successive applications.”).  Petitioner Thompson was convicted on 
November 4, 1983 of first-degree murder and forcible rape.  Calderon v. Thompson, 523 
U.S. 538, 544 (1998).  Petitioner’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed in the 
California State Supreme Court on April 28, 1988.  Id.  From the time that his convictions 
were affirmed, Thompson filed three consecutive applications for habeas relief.  Id. at 
544–45.  In 1995, Petitioner’s third application was granted relief as to his rape conviction 
and to a rape special circumstance (which made his death sentence invalid), but was de-
nied relief as to his murder conviction.  Id. at 545.   
   On June 19, 1996, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s ruling, reinstating the rape conviction, the special circumstance, and the death 
penalty; subsequently, Thompson filed a fourth habeas petition.  Calderon, 523 U.S. at 
545–46.  On July 22, 1997, Thompson filed a motion with the court of appeals to recall its 
mandate denying habeas relief,  On July 23, he filed an additional motion in district court 
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vented a Petitioner from discovering evidence which might provide a 
factual predicate for a permissible SSHP under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2), the court observed that it would be “incongruous” to 
treat a Rule 60(b) motion raising that claim as an SSHP:  a petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 would be insufficient, because (a) the peti-
tioner would not be in possession of the evidence in question; and 
(b) the State would have an incentive to shirk its disclosure obliga-
tions.50 
Four years after Calderon v. Thompson suggested that a court might 
entertain a Rule 60(b) motion in the context of a habeas proceeding, 
a dissenting opinion in the Eleventh Circuit outlined a more worka-
ble framework by which to determine whether Rule 60(b) motions 
should be treated as SSHP subject to the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 
2244.  In Mobley v. Head,51 the majority stayed the execution of a peti-
tioner pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Abdur’Rahman v. 
Bell.52  Notwithstanding the pending Supreme Court decision, the ma-
 
seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).  Id. at 546.  The district court de-
nied this Rule 60(b) motion as an SSHP.  Id. at 547.  The court of appeals first denied 
Thompson’s motion to recall its mandate, but reversed its decision, sua sponte, two days 
before the scheduled date of Thompson’s execution.  Id. at 547–48.  The court of appeals 
also affirmed the district court’s earlier grant of habeas relief, vacating Thompson’s death 
sentence.  Id. at 549.   
   In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the recall of the mandate did not con-
flict with the provisions of AEDPA, because the court of appeals had “acted on the exclu-
sive basis of Thompson’s first federal habeas petition.”  Id. at 554 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 
(b) (Supp. II 1994)).  The Court ultimately held, however, that the court of appeals had 
abused its discretion since the “miscarriage of justice” standard was not met in Thomp-
son’s case.  Id. at 566 (“Thompson’s evidence does not meet the ‘more likely than not’ 
showing necessary to vacate his stand-alone conviction of rape, much less the ‘clear and 
convincing’ showing necessary to vacate his sentence of death.”). 
   On remand, the Ninth Circuit reinstated the mandate, but also granted Thompson’s 
motion to reinstate the appeal of his Rule 60(b) motion, which had been dismissed as 
moot after the mandate had initially been recalled.  Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 920. 
 50 See Thompson, 151 F.3d at 921 n.3. 
 51 306 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 52 535 U.S. 1016 (2002) (granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 88 (2002).  In Ab-
dur’Rahman, the petitioner had filed a petition for habeas relief raising claims of ineffec-
tive counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  The district court granted habeas relief on 
the ineffective counsel claim, but denied as procedurally barred his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88, 89 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(withdrawing certiorari).  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting 
habeas relief (petitioner did not appeal denial of relief on the second claim).  Id. (citing 
226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000)).  Petitioner then filed a Rule 60(b) motion, claiming that 
the procedural bar ruling of the district court was based on a mistaken premise, citing 
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 39.  See id. at 92.  The district court held that the Rule 60(b) motion 
represented a “second or successive application,” and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision.  Id. at 93–94.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but later withdrew 
it as improvidently granted.  See id. 
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jority opined that the lower court had “fairly read” Felker’s absolute 
prohibition on the use of Rule 60(b) motions in the context of ha-
beas proceedings.53 
In his dissent, Judge Gerald Tjoflat argued that the majority was 
wrong to rely on Felker because Felker involved an attempt to introduce 
new constitutional claims into a habeas corpus petition.54  Judge Tjof-
lat read Felker’s conclusion that Rule 60(b) motions are barred un-
conditionally by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) within the context of that court’s 
interest in preventing the circumvention of AEDPA’s restrictions on 
successive habeas petitions.55  “True” Rule 60(b) motions, Judge Tjof-
lat argued, do not implicate these concerns.56  Judge Tjoflat observed 
that an SSHP will either cite claims arising from an intervening rule 
of constitutional law, or claims arising from the discovery of evidence 
previously unavailable through the exercise of due diligence:  neither 
type of claim “challenges the district court’s previous denial of relief 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”57  A petitioner seeking relief under Rule 
60(b), however, “impugn[s] . . . the integrity of the district court’s 
judgment rejecting his petition . . . . Asserting this claim is quite dif-
ferent from contending, as the petitioner would in a successive ha-
beas corpus petition, that his conviction or sentence was obtained 
[unconstitutionally pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254].”58 
The impact of Judge Tjoflat’s reasoning in the Mobley dissent was 
felt almost immediately, as his analysis was quoted approvingly by Jus-
tice Stevens in his dissent from the Supreme Court’s withdrawal of 
certiorari in Abdur’Rahman.59 
 
 
 53 Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1096 (citing Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657 (11th Cir. 1996) as a 
“bright-line rule” applying § 2244 (b) restrictions to all Rule 60(b) motions filed in re-
sponse to a denial of habeas relief). 
 54 See id. at 1098 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 55 Id. at 1102. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1100–01 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)). 
 58 Id. at 1101. 
 59 Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88, 95–96 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mob-
ley, 306 F.3d at 1100–05).  In his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that Judge Tjoflat’s rea-
soning was “fully consistent” with earlier Supreme Court decisions.  See Abdur’Rahman, 537 
U.S. at 96 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 
523 U.S. 637 (1998)). 
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C. The Eleventh Circuit Decision in Gonzalez v. Secretary for the 
Department of Corrections 
After the Supreme Court withdrew certiorari in Abdur’Rahman, the 
Eleventh Circuit joined Mobley with two other cases for rehearing en 
banc.60  The first joined case, Lazo v. United States, was a 2002 decision 
in which a federal prisoner invoked Rule 60(b) in an attempt to va-
cate the denial of his request for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.61  Af-
ter this motion was denied, he attempted to file an appeal with the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Distinguishing between a habeas petition that 
sought to overturn a conviction or sentence and a Rule 60(b) motion 
that sought only to narrowly attack some defect in the actual habeas 
proceeding, the panel concluded that the petitioner’s motion, as pre-
sented, was “the functional equivalent of a successive § 2255 mo-
tion.”62  Accordingly, the panel required that Lazo obtain a certificate 
of appealability before challenging his denied Rule 60(b) motion.63 
The second joined case involved Aurelio Gonzalez, a Florida state 
prisoner serving ninety-nine years for robbery with a firearm.64  Citing 
an intervening Supreme Court decision, Aurelio Gonzalez filed a 
Rule 60(b) motion in 2001 seeking relief from a district court deci-
sion dismissing his habeas petition as time-barred.65  The district court 
denied Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion in 2002.66  Although the district 
court denied Gonzalez a certificate of appealability, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit agreed to review the district court’s decision.67  The appellate 
court concluded that Gonzalez’s appeal sought relief not from the 
dismissal of his habeas petition, but from the denial of his Rule 60(b) 
motion; accordingly, the court held that Gonzalez needed a certifi-
cate of appealability properly directed to any issues arising from the 
2002 order before the court could review that decision.68  Reviewing 
Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion as a prayer for relief from the district 
 
 60 See Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr. (Gonzalez I), 366 F.3d 1253, 1253 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 61 Lazo v. United States, 314 F.3d 571, 575 (11th Cir. 2002) (denying a certificate of appea-
lability), vacated for reh’g en banc sub nom. Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 326 F.3d 
1175 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 62 Lazo, 314 F.3d at 573, cited in Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1260. 
 63 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1260. 
 64 Id. at 1260–61. 
 65 Id. at 1261.  The district court had originally granted Gonzalez a certificate of appealabili-
ty; the certificate was denied on review after the court of appeals vacated and remanded 
for clarification.  Id. 
 66 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1261. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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court’s dismissal of his habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit panel 
concluded that the intervening Supreme Court decision was not a va-
lid ground for Rule 60(b) relief.69  Unlike Lazo, in which the court 
had read the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion as a “masked” SSHP, the 
panel in Gonzalez v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections (Gonzalez I) 
relied on Mobley to assert that “in the post-AEDPA era all Rule 60(b) 
motions are to be treated as second or successive petitions,” and 
therefore subject to the blanket prohibition championed by Felker.70 
En banc, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that “[d]espite the cloth-
ing Lazo put on it,” his Rule 60(b) motion was, in fact, a successive 
habeas petition since “it does not concern a defect in the earlier 
§ 2255 proceeding . . . . [but] attacks the underlying judgment of 
conviction and sentence itself on grounds not asserted in the prior 
§ 2255 proceeding.”71  By contrast, motions which properly seek to set 
aside the prior denial of habeas corpus “on a traditional Rule 60(b) 
ground for relief from a prior judgment” were not held to be succes-
sive habeas petitions.72  For the purpose of appellate review, however, 
the distinction was moot:  the panel concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2253 
(c)(1) required that a petitioner obtain a certificate of appealability 
before seeking review of any final judgment in a habeas context, in-
cluding a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.73 
The court then attempted to reframe the debate, holding that 
Rule 60(b), in its complete form, was inconsistent with the provisions 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b).74  The court first affirmed that the primary 
intent of Congress in drafting AEDPA “was to ensure greater finality 
of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases,” in part 
through the restrictions placed on SSHP.75  A broad application of 
Rule 60(b), they argued, would effectively undermine Congress’s in-
 
 69 Id. at 1262. 
 70 Id. (emphasis added).  The panel also argued that, under existing pre-AEDPA circuit law, 
Gonzalez’s motion would have been denied, even in the absence of Mobley.  Id. 
 71 Id. at 1263 (citing Lazo v. United States, 314 F.3d 571, 572–73 (11th Cir. 2002)).  The 
court of appeals in Gonzalez held that their decision regarding the application of Rule 
60(b) motions to habeas proceedings should be applied equally to petitions originally 
made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as well as those made under § 2254.  Id. at 1262. 
 72  Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d. at 1263. 
 73 “By its plain terms the § 2253(c)(1) certificate of appealability requirement applies to 
‘the final order’ in a § 2254 or § 2255 proceeding, and Rule 60(b) motions have been 
considered final orders for appellate purposes in other types of proceedings.”  Id. at 1263 
(citations omitted). 
 74 Id. at 1270; see also Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Court, R. 
11, 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (2006). 
 75 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1269. 
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tent in passing these restrictions.76  The solution to this inconsistency, 
in the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit panel, was to restrict the au-
thority of the courts to consider Rule 60(b) motions in habeas pro-
ceedings to situations where the motion “is filed to correct a clerical 
mistake (meaning that it is really a Rule 60(a) motion),” or where the 
motion asserts claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by 
the state pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).77 
Judge Tjoflat, concurring in part and dissenting in part, first ob-
served that under the majority’s formulation the courts would treat 
“any motion based on . . . [Rule 60(b) grounds other than a 60(b)(3) 
claim of prosecutorial fraud or misconduct] as an . . . [SSHP] even if 
the motion contains no constitutional claim at all.”78  The majority opinion 
would also require an applicant to seek a certificate of appealability 
in order to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion.79  “[R]ather 
than adopting a flexible rule that would permit district courts to 
honor AEDPA’s aims without punishing the true Rule 60(b) mo-
vants,”80 the court had failed to recognize that Rule 60(b) had been 
implemented, in part, to establish a method of relief distinct from 
independent actions (such as habeas petitions).81  The majority had 
ignored that history, Judge Tjoflat argued, and had therefore under-
mined the intended distinction between the relief sought under a 
Rule 60(b) motion and the relief sought through a petition for ha-
beas corpus.82  Instead, Judge Tjoflat relied on his dissent in Mobley to 
demand that a distinction be drawn between authentic Rule 60(b) 
motions and attempts to disguise SSHP as Rule 60(b) motions: 
An SSHP, “like all habeas corpus petitions, is meant to remedy constitu-
tional violations (albeit ones which arise out of facts discovered or laws 
evolved after an initial habeas corpus proceeding), while a Rule 60(b) 
motion is designed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceed-
 
 76 Compare id. with United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 77 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1285–86. 
 78 Id. at 1288 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1297; see also id. at 1286 (Edmonson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(“[T]he view of Tjoflat, J.] seems more correct to me because it leaves Rule 60 more intact as 
well as crediting AEDPA.” (emphasis added)). 
 81 “The drafters of modern Rule 60(b) were unconcerned with ‘the substantive law as to the 
grounds for vacating judgments.’  Rather, they sought to create a comprehensive proce-
dural scheme, one that would ‘remove the uncertainties and historical limitations of an-
cient remedies while preserving all of the various kinds of relief that they afforded.”  Gon-
zalez I, 366 F.3d at 1290 (citations omitted). 
 82 Id. at 1288. 
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ing—here, a habeas corpus proceeding—that raises questions about that 
proceeding’s integrity.”83 
In his dissent, Judge Tjoflat also relied on Rodwell v. Pepe,84 in 
which the First Circuit refused to “subscribe to a ‘one size fits all’ tax-
onomy,” and instead ruled that a Rule 60(b) motion should be per-
mitted where the factual predicate addresses “some irregularity or 
procedural defect in the procurement of the judgment denying ha-
beas relief.”85  Where the factual predicate of a motion attacks the 
constitutionality of the conviction, the First Circuit determined, the 
motion “threatens to encroach upon the precincts patrolled by the 
AEDPA,” and must be dismissed as an SSHP.86  Using similar reason-
ing, Judge Tjoflat argued that applicants seeking review of a final 
judgment on a Rule 60(b) motion did not need to obtain a certificate 
of appealability because “final orders denying a Rule 60(b) motion 
do not adjudicate a constitutional challenge to the movant’s convic-
tion or sentence,” and therefore do not encroach on “precincts pa-
trolled by the AEDPA.”87 
D. Gonzalez v. Crosby 
After the Eleventh Circuit decision in Gonzalez I, Aurelio Gonzalez 
sought and was granted certiorari.  As a threshold matter, although 
the lower court decision was intended to apply equally to prisoners 
seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255, the 
Supreme Court’s 7-2 opinion explicitly limited its holding to those 
Rule 60(b) motions filed by state prisoners denied relief under 
§ 2254.88  The Court first focused on the word “applications” as used 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, concluding “it is clear that for purposes of 
§ 2244(b) an ‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that contains 
one or more ‘claims.’”89  Analogizing the use of the term “applica-
 
 83 Id. at 1292 (quoting Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d 1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting)); see also id. at 1297 (“[W]e should recognize that Rule 60(b) survives in 
AEDPA’s wake and fashion a holding that accounts for the essential differences between 
Rule 60(b) motions and [successive habeas petitions].”). 
 84 324 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 85 Id. at 70. 
 86 Id. at 71. 
 87 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1299; Rodwell, 324 F.3d at 71. 
 88 Compare Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no material difference 
in the relevant statutory language [between § 2254 and § 2255].”) with Gonzalez v. Cros-
by, 545 U.S. 524, 529, n.3 (2005) (“Although [the portion of § 2255 governing 
SSHP] . . . is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsection applicable to second or 
successive § 2254 petitions, it is not identical.”). 
 89 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. 
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tion” in other provisions of the United States Code, as well as the 
Court’s own use of the term in an earlier case involving § 2254(d), 
the majority determined that “[t]hese statutes, and our own deci-
sions, make clear that a ‘claim’ as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted fed-
eral basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.”90  To 
conclude otherwise, the Court held, “circumvents AEDPA’s require-
ment that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new 
rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts.”91  The Court ob-
served that various appellate courts, when faced with nominal Rule 
60(b) motions, consistently treated them as SSHP where they asserted 
such federal bases for relief.92  “[L]ike all habeas corpus petitions,” 
these federal bases of relief were “meant to remedy constitutional vi-
olations (albeit ones which arise out of facts discovered or law evolved 
after an initial habeas corpus proceeding).”93  While the majority nev-
er mentioned Judge Tjoflat in their opinion, the definition of “claim” 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez is consistent with the defi-
nition developed by Judge Tjoflat in identifying masked Rule 60(b) 
motions, which are ultimately intended to address “constitutional 
claims by prisoners.”94 
Having adopted a workable definition of “claim,” the Court then 
turned to the question of whether a Rule 60(b) motion advances a 
claim, requiring the motion to be read as a successive habeas petition 
(and therefore held to § 2244 (b)’s restrictions).  In most cases, the 
Court observed, the determination will not present a challenge.95  In 
closer cases, the Court suggested that a motion attacking a court’s 
decision on a claim should itself be treated as a claim, where the tar-
geted decision was reached on the merits:  “[A]lleging that the court 
erred in denying habeas relief on the merits,” the Court reasoned, “is 
effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant 
is . . . entitled to habeas relief.”96  On the other hand, “[i]f neither the 
motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief sub-
 
 90 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003)). 
 91 Id. at 531. 
 92 See id. (citing Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2004) (Rule 60(b)(1) 
claim arising from counsel’s failure to raise a Sixth Amendment claim in the initial peti-
tion); Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d at 66 (Rule 60(b)(2) claim arising from newly discovered 
evidence); Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rule 60(b)(6) claim arising 
from an intervening change in substantive law)). 
 93 Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d 1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 94 Id. 
 95 “A motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief . . . will of course qualify [as an 
SSHP].”  Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (citing Harris, 367 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 96 Id. at 532. 
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stantially addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s 
state conviction,” the Court saw no conflict between the goals of 
AEDPA and those of Rule 60(b).97  In linking the word “claim” to the 
assertions made in nominal Rule 60(b) motions, the Court almost 
explicitly restated the distinction drawn by Judge Tjoflat in both Mob-
ley and Gonzalez I, without referring to him or to his earlier opinions.98 
Finally, the majority turned to Calderon v. Thompson,99 on which the 
Eleventh Circuit relied in order to support the notion that Rule 
60(b) was “inconsistent and irreconcilable with AEDPA’s purpose.”100  
The Eleventh Circuit panel had analogized Calderon’s discussion of a 
court’s authority to recall a mandate to the use of Rule 60(b) before 
them, concluding that “[t]he unfettered application of either proce-
dure” in habeas cases would “undermine . . . important principles 
and values” protected by AEDPA.101  The Supreme Court rejected this 
analogy:  while Calderon did state that “a prisoner’s motion to recall 
the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be 
regarded as a second or successive application,” the Court found that 
this statement did not conflict with its understanding that a Rule 
60(b) motion challenging a federal court denial on the merits should 
be treated as a successive habeas petition.102  Because Gonzalez’s mo-
tion “challenges only the District Court’s previous ruling on the 
AEDPA statute of limitations,” the Court ruled “it is not the equiva-
lent of a successive habeas petition.”103  The Court affirmed the “un-
questionably valid role” that Rule 60(b) may play in habeas cases, and 
noted “several characteristics of Rule 60(b) motion[s]” that eased the 
conflict between the Rule and § 2244 and that would insulate the 
 
 97 Id. at 533. 
 98 Compare Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (distinguishing situations in which “a Rule 60(b) motion 
attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on its merits, but 
some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” (emphasis added)) with Gonzalez I, 
366 F.3d 1253, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“[A] Rule 60(b) motion is 
designed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceeding . . . that raises questions 
about that proceeding’s integrity.” (quoting Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissent-
ing)) and Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (identifying a true Rule 60(b) 
motion as “impugning the integrity of the district court’s judgment reject-
ing . . . [movant’s] petition”). 
 99 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
100 Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1271. 
101 Id. at 1275. 
102 Calderon, 523 U.S. at 553, quoted in Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534. 
103 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535–36.  Although the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s reason-
ing in Gonzalez I, the majority opinion still affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment in 
the case, since the Court found that the intervening Supreme Court decision which had 
inspired Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion did not meet the “extraordinary circumstances” 
standard required for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).  Id. at 538. 
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courts from “an avalanche of frivolous postjudgment motions”:  (1) 
Rule 60(b)’s own time limitations; (2) the high evidentiary threshold 
of “extraordinary circumstances” required from a movant seeking re-
lief under the “catchall” provision of Rule 60(b)(6); and (3) the li-
mited and deferential appellate review available for Rule 60(b) pro-
ceedings.104 
Concurring with the majority opinion, Justice Breyer approvingly 
cited Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion in Gonzalez I, observing that it 
was consistent with the majority’s understanding of the proper limits 
of a true Rule 60(b) motion.105  He wrote separately, however, to un-
derscore the distinction between Rule 60(b) motions designed to at-
tack the merits of a lower court decision, and those intended to ad-
dress issues with the integrity of the process, fearing that the Court’s 
decision to deconstruct the word “claim” would only serve to cloud 
the issue.106  While dissenting on other grounds, Justice Stevens em-
braced the majority’s refusal to narrowly restrict the use of Rule 60(b) 
motions only to those alleging Rule 60(b)(3) fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or misconduct.107 
IV.  PHELPS V. ALAMEIDA108 AND THE BROADER IMPACT OF GONZALEZ 
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez, federal 
courts have worked to determine whether a Rule 60(b) motion seek-
ing relief from a final judgment in habeas proceedings actually ad-
vances a claim on the merits, or whether it seeks to attack “some de-
fect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.”109  A Ninth 
 
104 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534–35 (citing scenarios implicating Rules 60(b)(1) and (4)). 
105 Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
106 See id. at 538–39 (“I fear that other language in the majority’s opinion, especially its dis-
cussion of the significance of the word ‘claim,’ could be taken to imply a different stan-
dard, with which I would disagree.”). 
107 Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Ultimately, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had 
overstepped in addressing the merits of Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion.  Id. 
108    Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1072      
          (2010). 
109 See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; see e.g., Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 
2006) (treating petitioner’s appeal of a district court’s ruling as a “true” Rule 60(b) mo-
tion, because the motion did not attack the substance of the district court’s ruling, but ra-
ther the lower court’s “failure to make any ruling on a claim that was properly pre-
sented”); see also Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Although an 
assertion of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel may be characterized as a defect in 
the integrity of the habeas proceeding, it ultimately seeks to assert or reassert substantive 
claims with the assistance of new counsel.”).  But see Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 424–
25 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It makes no difference that the [Rule 60(b)] motion it-
self . . . purports to raise a defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings, . . .  all that 
matters is that . . . [Petitioner] is . . . advanc[ing] a claim by taking steps that lead inexor-
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Circuit decision whose procedural history straddles both sides of the 
Gonzalez divide illustrates this effort.  In 1994, Kevin Phelps was con-
victed of murder in a California state court after two previous trials 
had concluded in hung juries.110  After exhausting his remedies in the 
state courts, including a state habeas process, Phelps sought federal 
habeas relief in 1998:  one year and fifteen days after the California 
State Supreme Court filed its decision not to review Phelps’s denied 
state habeas petition.111  The district court ruled that Phelps’s petition 
was untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, finding 
that the California State Supreme Court’s denial of review had be-
come final on that court’s filing date.112  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s opinion in an unpublished memorandum on Jan-
uary 26, 1999.113  In 2001, fifteen months after Phelps’s appeal be-
came final, the Ninth Circuit resolved conclusively that a California 
court’s decision not to review a denied state habeas petition did not 
become final until thirty days after the court’s filing date; therefore, 
Phelps’s federal habeas petition was not untimely.114 
Because the Ninth Circuit’s ruling meant that Phelps’s original 
petition had been improperly dismissed, Phelps filed a Rule 60(b) 
motion asking that the district court review their earlier dismissal “in 
light of the intervening change in the law.”115  The district court in-
terpreted Phelps’s Rule 60(b) motion as an SSHP and, because 
Phelps had not obtained permission from the court of appeals before 
filing, dismissed the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.116 
After the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Gonzalez, Phelps again 
asked the district court to review its original decision to dismiss his 
habeas petition as untimely, “a dismissal that by this point was predi-
cated on two indisputably erroneous legal rulings.”117  The district 
 
ably to a merits-based attack on the prior dismissal of his habeas petition.” (alteration in 
original)). 
110 Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1124. 
111 Id. at 1125. 
112 Id.  Under California law, “decisions” of the California Supreme Court become final thirty 
days after they are filed, while “orders” become final on the day that they are filed.  The 
district court acknowledged that, in this context, the state courts had not “clearly articu-
lated” a distinction between decisions and orders.  Id. at 1126.  Nevertheless, the district 
court accepted the State’s argument that the denial of review was, in fact, an order.  Id. 
113 Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1126. 
114 Id. at 1127 (citing Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)).  Improperly relying on an analysis of the merits by the 
district court, a panel of the Ninth Circuit dismissed Phelps’s certificate of appealability 
regarding this decision as improvidently granted.  Id. at 1127–28. 
117 Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1128. 
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court denied Phelps’s request for reconsideration, and denied him a 
certificate of appealability to seek review of this denied request for 
reconsideration.118  Phelps sought a certificate of appealability from 
the Ninth Circuit, which was initially denied.119  Eventually, however, 
the Ninth Circuit granted Phelps reconsideration of this most recent 
decision, and ultimately granted him a certificate of appealability as 
to whether his circumstances were sufficiently “extraordinary” to sup-
port a grant of relief under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).120 
The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s denial of 
Phelps’s motion for reconsideration as to whether his federal habeas 
petition was untimely.  The panel expressed alarm that “a concern for 
procedure has far too often obscured or eclipsed the equally impor-
tant if not greater role to be played by our dedication to justice,” and 
declared that “Phelps’ case represents the epitome of our obsession 
with form over substance.”121  The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Phelps’s motion for reconsideration before the district court did de-
scribe “extraordinary circumstances,” and remanded the case with in-
structions that “the decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief must be 
measured by the incessant command of the court’s conscience that 
justice be done in light of all the facts.”122  The Ninth Circuit decision 
in Phelps recognizes the considerations of equity contemplated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez, and seems more in line with 
the considerations that informed pre-AEDPA cases.123 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In both wording and legislative context, the AEDPA demonstrates 
a clear intent to restrict the ability of state prisoners to repeatedly 
seek the reversal of their state court convictions in the federal court 
system.  If too broadly read, however, the provisions of § 2244 would 
overreach that Congressional purpose:  such a reading would block 
not only potentially abusive attacks on an underlying conviction, but 
would also bar state prisoners from raising legitimate concerns aris-
ing from the habeas process itself.  In trying to balance these appar-
ently conflicting interests, the Eleventh Circuit in Gonzalez I drew the 
 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1129. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 1141. 
122 Id. at 1137–1141 (quoting Stokes v. Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 736 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
123 See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1962) (“An applicant for . . . [collateral 
relief] ought not to be held to the niceties of lawyers’ pleadings.”). 
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line too narrowly, defining legitimacy within too strict a statutory 
framework.  By contrast, the Supreme Court decision in Gonzalez v. 
Crosby provides for a slightly more permissive examination of the ex-
act relief sought in a nominal Rule 60(b) motion.  As a result, Gonza-
lez provides a slightly broader framework for relief, addressing con-
cerns of equity particularly in those cases where “life or liberty is at 
stake.”124  At the same time, Gonzalez’s “claim” definition prevents Rule 
60(b) from providing grounds for relief that would serve to address 
the underlying conviction, thereby undermining the express purpose 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 
 
124 Id. at 8. 
